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Pardo: Second-Order Proof Rules

SECOND-ORDER PROOF RULES
Michael S. Pardo*
Abstract
Proof rules in law dictate when facts have been proven. They do so by
specifying a level of proof such as by a preponderance of the evidence, by
clear and convincing evidence, or beyond a reasonable doubt. The goals of
the rules are to minimize errors (accuracy) and to allocate the risk of error
fairly. I argue that the current rules fail to serve these two goals. Rather
than suggesting we abandon these well-entrenched rules, I propose and
argue for “second order” proof rules that will better align decision-making
with its goals by providing criteria for applying the current rules. The
second-order rules have the potential to improve not only factual decisionmaking at trial but also decisions implementing procedural rules that
depend on judgments about the “sufficiency of the evidence.” These
procedural rules include summary judgment and judgment as a matter of
law in civil cases and sufficiency challenges by criminal defendants.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Proof rules in law specify when a disputed fact has been proven. They
function as decision-making rules by instructing jurors and judges when to
conclude, based on the evidence, that a fact has been proven. They carry
out this function by specifying a level or standard of proof: “beyond a
reasonable doubt,” “by a preponderance of the evidence,” or “by clear and
convincing evidence.”1 Although proof rules are the most familiar example
of decision rules in law, decision rules are not limited to proof rules and
are a pervasive feature of law in general.2
Imposing general rules on decision-making reflects policy choices.
Rules are made, adopted, and justified for underlying reasons, and in any
given case these reasons might be better served by bypassing the rule and
examining directly how the case fits with the reasons. The decision to
impose a rule, rather than simply appealing to underlying reasons, thus
must itself be justified. And a number of considerations may justify this
decision, including: guiding, constraining, and easing the decision-making
process, as well as providing authority to the jurisdictionally proper
decisionmaker.3 These considerations underlie the proof rules in law.
Factual disputes inevitably involve decision-making errors. How can
such errors be minimized? How should the risk of error be allocated
among the parties? These considerations may be left to be worked out by
each judge or jury on a case-by-case basis or they may be the subject of
general rules.4 The law adopts the latter strategy.5 As discussed more fully
below, the “preponderance” rule in civil cases expresses a choice to treat
1. Nothing in my analysis depends on a distinction between “rules” and “standards.” I use
“rule” to refer to any legal directive, including directives that employ “standards.” Later in this
Article, I return to the rules-standards distinction, but only as a way of clarifying the analysis. In
short, nothing turns on a choice of labels. See infra Part IV.C.
2. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 (2004)
(demonstrating the ubiquity of decision rules in constitutional law doctrine).
3. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULEBASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 135–66 (1991) (discussing the justifications for
adopting rules).
4. The decision to adopt a rule is thus itself a “second order” decision. Cass R. Sunstein &
Edna Ullman-Margalit, Second-Order Decisions, 110 ETHICS 5, 7 (1999) (defining second-order
decisions as “decisions about the appropriate strategy for reducing the problems associated with
making a first-order decision.”). This Article will propose “second order” rules that apply to
already established first-order rules (which themselves apply to first-order decisions).
5. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 757 (1982) (“Standards of proof, like other
‘procedural due process rules[,] are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process
as applied to the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions.’ Since the litigants and the factfinder
must know at the outset of a given proceeding how the risk of error will be allocated, the standard
of proof necessarily must be calibrated in advance.” (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
344 (1976))); see also ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW xi (Oxford University Press
2005) (“There is no moral, political, or economic justification for authorizing individual
adjudicators . . . to allocate the risk of error as they deem fit.”).
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parties roughly equally with regard to the risk of error and to attempt to
minimize total errors.6 The “beyond a reasonable doubt” decision rule in
criminal cases—and to a lesser extent the “clear and convincing” rule in
civil cases—expresses a choice to allocate more of the risk of error (or
expected losses) away from defendants.
In this Article, I argue that the proof rules fail to serve their purported
goals concerning error minimization and allocation. I propose and argue
for a solution in the form of “second order” proof rules. A second-order
proof rule instructs decisionmakers how to apply “first order” rules. Thus,
a second-order rule in this context instructs judges and juries when to
conclude that a fact has been proven by a preponderance of the evidence,
by clear and convincing evidence, or beyond a reasonable doubt.7
The significance of second-order rules occurs on two levels. First, they
potentially improve fact-finding at trial by better aligning conclusions with
the underlying goals of the proof rules. Second, the rules also have wideranging significance for procedural devices that depend on the sufficiency
of evidence. These devices include summary judgment,8 judgment as a
matter of law in civil cases,9 and sufficiency challenges by criminal
defendants.10 As discussed below, the standards for implementing these
civil and criminal procedural rules depend on the underlying proof rules.
Thus, by bringing clarity to the proof rules, the second-order rules also
bring needed clarity to applications of these procedural devices. The
second-order rules provide wide-ranging significance at the procedural
level by guiding and constraining decision-making on whether parties get
to trial in the first place, whether verdicts will be overturned or upheld, and
6. The risk is allocated “roughly” equally because plaintiffs bear the slightly additional risk
of cases ending in a “tie,” or cases in which the evidence is in equipoise. Alternatively, the
preponderance rule may be viewed as an attempt to minimize the total expected costs of
adjudicative errors. See generally David H. Kaye, Clarifying the Burden of Persuasion: What
Bayesian Decision Rules Do and Do Not Do, 3 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 1 (1999) (adopting an
expected-losses approach to proof rules).
7. A note on terminology may be helpful. As I use it, a “second order” rule is simply a rule
that guides the application of another rule or rules. It may do so in a variety of ways—for example,
by providing a rule for interpreting the underlying rule; by declaring some applications to be
legitimate or illegitimate; or by specifying who does and does not possess authority to apply the
underlying rule. A second-order rule is thus more specific than a second-order decision. The
decision to adopt a rule in the first place may be a second-order decision. See Sunstein & UllmanMargalit, supra note 4, at 7. My use also differs from what Lea Brilmayer has referred to as “second
order” evidence (i.e., propositions about evidence). See Lea Brilmayer, Second-Order Evidence and
Bayesian Logic, 66 B.U. L. REV. 673, 673–74 (1986). My use also differs from the use of “second
order” in the domain of logic. See Herbert B. Enderton, Second-order and Higher-order Logic, in
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2009), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
logic-higher-order/.
8. FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
9. FED. R. CIV. P. 50.
10. FED. R. CRIM. P. 29; Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
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whether a party’s constitutional rights are protected.11
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part II discusses the goals and
functions of proof rules. Part III demonstrates the failures of current proof
rules in light of their goals. Part IV presents second-order rules and
explains how they bring the first-order rules in line with these goals. Part V
discusses how to operationalize the second-order rules at trial and for
sufficiency-of-the-evidence reviews. Part VI concludes with some
implications of the analysis.
II. THE GOALS AND FUNCTIONS OF PROOF RULES
Decisions regarding factual disputes take place under conditions of
uncertainty.12 By dictating outcomes under these conditions, proof rules
serve two functions: (1) to minimize total errors or certain types of errors,
and (2) to allocate the risk of erroneous decisions between the parties.13
The first function fosters the fundamental goal of adjudication: truth or
factual accuracy.14 The second function fosters the goal of either equalizing
the risk of error among the parties or minimizing the risk for one side.15
11. These rights include criminal defendants’ due-process right that criminal convictions must
be supported by sufficient evidence, see Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, and Seventh Amendment jurytrial rights of civil litigants, see U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
12. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 341 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999) (1954) (“[A]
lawsuit is essentially a search of probabilities. A margin of error must be anticipated in any such
search. Mistakes will be made . . . .”).
13. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755 (1982) (explaining that proof rules involve
judgments about “the weight of the private and public interests affected” and “a societal judgment
about how the risk of error should be distributed between the litigants”); Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (explaining that a proof rule “serves to allocate the risk of error between the
litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision”); In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (explaining that proof rules “reflect a very
fundamental assessment of the comparative social costs of erroneous factual determinations”). For
discussions of these functions, see STEIN, supra note 5, at 134; Michael L. DeKay, The Difference
Between Blackstone-Like Error Ratios and Probabilistic Standards of Proof, 21 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 95, 125–26 (1996); David Hamer, Probabilistic Standards of Proof, Their Complements
and the Errors that are Expected to Flow from Them, 1 U. NEW ENG. L. J. 71 (2007); Erik Lillquist,
Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and the Virtues of Variability, 36 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 85, 147–62 (2002); Neil Orloff & Jery Stedinger, A Framework for Evaluating the
Preponderance-of-the-Evidence Standard, 131 U. PENN. L. REV. 1159 (1983); see generally Kaye,
supra note 6 (conceptualizing proof rules in terms of total expected losses).
14. See FED. R. EVID. 102; see also WILLIAM TWINING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE: EXPLORATORY
ESSAYS 73 (1994) (“Establishing the truth . . . is a necessary condition for achieving justice in
adjudication; incorrect results are one form of injustice.”). This role of proof rules is sometimes
overlooked when analyzing them, with focus directed more toward the distribution of errors or the
rate of certain types of errors (e.g., false convictions in criminal cases) rather than on the utilities of
different types of accurate outcomes. For a discussion of this point in the criminal context, see
Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, 65 TEXAS TECH L. REV. 65, 75–80 (2008).
15. I distinguish the “functions” of proof rules from their “goals.” The functions concern how
they operate to (or the means by which they) achieve their goals. See PETER ACHINSTEIN, THE
NATURE OF EXPLANATION 280 (1983) (“Functions are intimately related to ends of certain kinds, and
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To illustrate these two functions, consider the following simplified
example. Suppose Andy claims that he and Betty entered into a contract,
and she denies doing so. To resolve this dispute, the law assigns the burden
of proof to one party—e.g., Andy.16 He must produce sufficient evidence to
support his claim, which is met by producing enough evidence to satisfy
the burden of persuasion.17 To meet the burden of persuasion, Andy must
satisfy the proof rule.
Now, suppose the proof rule requires that Andy persuade the
decisionmaker to a level of “certainty.” Under this rule, if there is any
doubt as to whether the parties entered into a contract, Andy will lose. Any
uncertainty will therefore benefit Betty. There is a reciprocal relationship
between Andy and Betty—the harder it is for Andy to win, the easier it is
for Betty to win, and vice versa. This reciprocal relationship illuminates the
first function of proof rules: allocating the risk of error. When Andy must
prove with certainty that a contract was made, he bears the entire risk of
error. Because a decision when the evidence is uncertain will be for Betty,
an error in this case will favor Betty and go against Andy.18 If the proof
burden lowers, Andy will bear less risk of error and Betty will bear a
correspondingly greater amount.19 By lowering the burden the proof rule
requires, a decision may go against Betty even when the facts are uncertain.
In addition to allocating risk, the second function of decision rules is to
minimize total errors or certain types of errors. Raising the level of proof
for one party (e.g., Andy) has, other things being equal, the consequence of
lowering the risk of error for the other party (e.g., Betty). Thus, by
minimizing one type of error (e.g., false positives, which favor plaintiffs),
the level of proof ought to shift accordingly. But, given the reciprocal
relationship, doing so will raise the likelihood of errors on the other side
(e.g., false negatives, which favor defendants). The choice among possible
decision rules will thus involve a choice of whether one type of error
should be minimized at the expense of the other.20
the items to which functions are attributed are means to those ends.”).
16. Plaintiffs and prosecutors typically have the burden of proof for the elements of claims or
crimes, and defendants typically have the burden of proof for affirmative defenses.
17. John T. McNaughton, Burdens of Production of Evidence: A Function of the Burden of
Persuasion, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1382, 1382 (1955).
18. Errors under this rule will be all false negatives, i.e., failures to find a contract when one
was in fact made. A proof rule of “certainty” would have the problematic consequences that
virtually no plaintiff could win in a civil case and virtually no criminal defendant could be
convicted. Under a “certainty” rule, the criminal and civil litigation systems would fail; settlements
and plea bargains would break down; wrongs would not be righted; and the law would fail to deter.
A second option might be to hold off deciding until certainty is achieved; however, litigation (and
justice) requires that a relatively timely decision be made, even in the face of factual uncertainty. A
decision not to decide is, in effect, a decision for the status quo.
19. Cruzan v. Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 283 (1990) (“The more stringent the
burden of proof a party must bear, the more that party bears the risk of an erroneous decision.”).
20. The choice among rules will therefore involve some assessment of the costs or losses
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To minimize the total (expected) number of errors, the decision rule
should require a finding for whichever side’s position is better supported
by the evidence. Assuming the evidence is a good indicator of truth,
findings better supported by the evidence will produce fewer overall errors
than reaching conclusions less supported by the evidence. Decisionmakers
will “maximize the total number of correct decisions by treating their best
chances of arriving at the factually correct result as decisive.”21
The analysis thus far is subject to three limitations. First, the number
and types of errors produced will depend upon the number of truly
deserving parties on each side.22 Consider two extreme examples. If every
plaintiff who went to trial deserved to win and every defendant deserved to
lose, then—regardless of the proof rule—the only possible errors would be
erroneous findings for defendants. Likewise, if all criminal defendants
were in fact guilty, then the possible errors would go in one direction only.
The actual number of errors will depend as an empirical matter on the ratio
of deserving plaintiffs and defendants. Second, the number and types of
errors will depend on the quality of the evidential base on which decisions
are made.23 If the evidence is either so poor or systematically skewed in
favor of one side, then this may affect both the number and types of errors.
Finally, if evidence is significantly misinterpreted by decisionmakers, then
this could likewise alter the number and types of errors.
Different proof rules express different policy preferences with regard to
error allocation and error minimization. The decision rule in civil cases of
associated with different types of errors. As Justice Harlan explained in In re Winship:
If, for example, the standard of proof for a criminal trial were a preponderance of
the evidence rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, there would be a
smaller risk of factual errors that result in freeing guilty persons, but a far greater
risk of factual errors that result in convicting the innocent. Because the standard of
proof affects the comparative frequency of these two types of erroneous outcomes,
the choice of the standard to be applied in a particular kind of litigation should, in
a rational world, reflect an assessment of the comparative social disutility of each.
397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
21. See STEIN, supra note 5, at 144. Stein explains:
[T]he error-minimizing objective treats every error as a fixed disutility unit (u).
Consequently, there is no difference between errors that harm defendants (false
positives) and errors that harm claimants or prosecutors (false negatives). Under
this assumption, utility demands that a party whose case has a probability P
prevails whenever Pu > (1-P)u, that is whenever P > 0.5.
STEIN, supra note 5, at 143–44.
22. See LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL
EPISTEMOLOGY 73 (Cambridge University Press 2006) (arguing that “the ratio of errors in real
trials” depends on “[t]he distribution of truly innocent and truly guilty defendants who go to trial.”);
see also Ronald J. Allen, Rationality, Algorithms, and Juridical Proof: A Preliminary Inquiry, 1
INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 254, 255 (1997).
23. See LAUDAN, supra note 22, at 73.
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a “preponderance of the evidence” reflects the preference for treating
plaintiffs and defendants roughly equally with regard to error allocation. As
the Supreme Court has explained, “the preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard results in a roughly equal allocation of the risk of error between
litigants,”24 noting that “[a]ny other standard expresses a preference for one
side’s interests.”25 This further reflects the view that the importance or cost
of an error against one side is roughly equivalent to an error against the
other side.26 Given the above limitations, however, we do not know
whether the rule will in fact equalize errors (or their costs). In the absence
of this information, the preponderance rule expresses the important
procedural value of treating the parties equally at the start of the process.27
Moreover, subject to the above limitations, the preponderance rule also
will minimize total errors.28
The proof rule in criminal cases of “beyond a reasonable doubt”
(BARD) reflects a preference for protecting criminal defendants with
regard to the risk of error. By requiring that the prosecution prove each
element of a crime BARD, the prosecution bears a greater risk of error than
civil plaintiffs under the preponderance rule.29 This greater risk includes
any situation in which an element has been proven by a preponderance, but
24. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) (presuming that this rule applies in civil
actions unless “particularly important individual interests or rights are at stake”) (internal citations
omitted).
25. Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 (1983).
26. In re Winship, 379 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“In a civil suit between
two private parties for money damages, for example, we view it as no more serious in general for
there to be an erroneous verdict in the defendant’s favor than for there to be an erroneous verdict in
the plaintiff’s favor.”). This equalizing function can be conceived of in terms of equalizing the
number of errors, see generally STEIN, supra note 5 (conceiving an equalizing function in terms of
equalizing the number of errors), or in terms of equalizing error costs, see David Kaye, Naked
Statistical Evidence, 89 YALE L.J. 601, 604–06 (1980) (reviewing MICHAEL FINKELSTEIN,
QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN LAW: STUDIES IN APPLICATION OF MATHEMATICAL PROBABILITY AND
STATISTICS TO LEGAL PROBLEMS (1978)).
27. See Ronald J. Allen, Burdens of Proof, Ambiguity, and Uncertainty in Modern Legal
Discourse, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 627, 633–34 (1994) (“the typical civil case involves a
contest between two indistinguishable parties vying over some good, and there is no reason in
advance to favor one party or the other. We thus strive to treat them equally by making errors
against them in a roughly symmetrical fashion.”); Ronald J. Allen, The Error of Expected Loss
Minimization, 2 LAW PROBABILITY & RISK 1, 4 (2003) (“[T]he preponderance rule manifests the
general social policy to be fair and evenhanded to all the parties, as jurors standardly are explicitly
instructed, and equal treatment is incontrovertibly one critical component of fairness.”). On the role
of equality in procedural justice, see Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV.
181, 286–89 (2004).
28. See STEIN, supra note 5.
29. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423–24 (1979) (“In the administration of criminal
justice, our society imposes almost the entire risk of error upon itself. This is accomplished by
requiring under the Due Process Clause that the state prove the guilt of an accused beyond a
reasonable doubt.”).
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not BARD; rather than convict and risk an erroneous conviction, an
acquittal is required. This asymmetry expresses, and is justified by, the
belief that the importance or cost of a false conviction is much greater than
a false acquittal.30
A third decision rule is proof by “clear and convincing evidence.” This
rule requires an “intermediate standard of proof” between the
preponderance rule and the BARD rule.31 It creates an asymmetry
regarding the risk of error, favoring defendants over plaintiffs, but not as
asymmetrical as under the BARD rule. The additional risk of error borne
by plaintiffs occurs whenever a proposition is proven by a preponderance
but not by clear and convincing evidence.32 This decision rule applies in
civil cases in which errors going against defendants are considered to be
more important or costly than errors favoring defendants.33 For example,
the clear-and-convincing rule applies in cases involving fraud,34 civil
commitment,35 deportation,36 denaturalization,37 termination of parental
rights,38 decisions to terminate life,39 and freedom of speech.40
I conclude this Part by considering briefly the possibility of leaving the
choice of particular proof rules to decisionmakers in particular cases.41
This option would inject further uncertainty into the proof process, and it
would lead to unjust consequences. It would allow the risk of error to be
allocated unfairly in a given case (e.g., a rule lower than the preponderance
rule) and inconsistently among cases (e.g., a rule higher than BARD in a

30. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (“[W]e do not view the social disutility of convicting an
innocent man as equivalent to the disutility of acquitting someone who is guilty.”); MCCORMICK,
supra note 12, § 341 (“[T]he courts may have increased the total number of mistaken decisions in
criminal cases, but with the worthy goal of decreasing the number of one kind of mistake—
conviction of the innocent.”).
31. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982).
32. See John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065,
1072–73 (1968). But, by contrast, plaintiffs no longer bear the risk of error that is borne by the
prosecution in criminal cases for propositions proven by clear and convincing evidence but not
BARD.
33. Addington, 441 U.S. at 424 (“[T]his Court has used the ‘clear, unequivocal and
convincing’ standard of proof to protect particularly important individual interests in various civil
cases.”).
34. See, e.g., Thorne v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 67, 87 (1992).
35. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 424.
36. See Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285–86 (1966).
37. See Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 158–59 (1943).
38. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982).
39. See Cruzan v. Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 265 (1990).
40. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285–86 (1964).
41. Professors Dale Nance and Erik Lillquist have each suggested that the proof rules may
still allow jurors to adjust the level proof on a case-by-case basis. Lillquist, supra note 13, at 147–
62; Dale A. Nance, Evidential Completeness and the Burden of Proof, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 621, 624
(1998) (noting this is not “part of the standard interpretation”).
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similar case).42 The U.S. Supreme Court has therefore rejected this option,
explaining that:
this Court never has approved case-by-case determination of
the proper standard of proof for a given proceeding.
Standards of proof, like other “procedural due process rules,
are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding
process as applied to the generality of cases, not the rare
exceptions.” Since the litigants and the factfinder must know
at the outset of a given proceeding how the risk of error will
be allocated, the standard of proof necessarily must be
calibrated in advance.43
III. THE FAILURES OF FIRST-ORDER PROOF RULES
Proof rules dictate when a fact has been proven,44 and these conclusions
ought to foster the underlying goals expressed by the rules. These goals
include policy choices regarding accuracy (error minimization) and
fairness (error allocation). Current proof rules—preponderance, BARD,
and clear-and-convincing—fail to guide and constrain decision-making
consistent with these goals. These failures create problems for decisionmaking at trial.
Less obvious, but perhaps more wide-ranging, these failures also create
problems for various procedural devices that require judgments about the
sufficiency of evidence. These devices include summary judgment45 and
judgment as a matter of law46 in civil cases and defendant challenges to the
sufficiency of the evidence in criminal cases.47 As will be explained below,
failures of the proof rules contribute to problems regarding whether parties
will get to trial in the first place, whether particular verdicts will be upheld
or overturned, and whether civil parties’ and criminal defendants’
constitutional rights will be protected. In this Part, I first discuss the proof
rules and fact-finding at trial and then discuss their effects on procedural
devices.
A. Preponderance of the Evidence
The phrase “preponderance of the evidence” is ambiguous. The word
“preponderance” refers to a superiority of some kind, but it may refer to a
superiority of weight, power, importance, strength, or quantity.48 “The
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See STEIN, supra note 5.
Santosky, 455 U.S. at 757 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976)).
Id.
FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
FED. R. CIV. P. 50.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 314–18 (1979); FED. R. CRIM. P. 29.
Merriam Webster defines “preponderance” as “a superiority in weight, power,
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prevailing view” of the preponderance rule requires the jury to be
“persuaded that the points to be proved are more probably so than not.”49
Moreover, “[w]hat counts is not the volume of evidence but quality.”50
Jury instructions typically direct jurors to consult the degree to which they
are persuaded that the facts are true. Consider two examples:
preponderance requires “belief that what is sought to be proved is more
likely true than not,”51 and that jurors “must be persuaded that it is more
probably true than not true.”52
These instructions lead to two problems. First, telling jurors to decide
that a fact has been proven when they are “persuaded” or “believe” that a
proposition is more likely true than not, fails to provide any guidance on
when such conclusions are warranted based on the evidence.53 Jurors may
be persuaded that certain propositions are more likely true than not for
completely irrational and unwarranted reasons or for reasons having
nothing to do with the evidence. A rule that turns solely on the subjective
beliefs of decisionmakers is unlikely to either minimize errors or distribute
the risk of error roughly evenly among the parties. Indeed, a rule that
instructs decisionmakers to draw conclusions that they already believe,
after observing the evidence, may function similarly to no rule at all. Nor
does simply telling jurors to “consider all the evidence” alleviate this
problem.54 In the absence of guidance on how to consider the evidence,

importance, or strength” and “a superiority or excess in number or quantity.” See MERRIAM
WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/prepon
derance; see also OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2d. V. VII 378 (defining “preponderance” as “1.
The fact of exceeding in weight; greater heaviness.”).
49. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 3.3 (2d. ed. 2003).
50. Id.
51. KEVIN F. O’MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 104.01 (5th ed.
2000).
52. FEDERAL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 34 (2005).
53. Further instructions to decide based solely on the formal evidence also fail to provide this
guidance. First, it is impossible for jurors to draw inferences from the formal evidence without
relying on their background knowledge, beliefs, and assumptions as well as the formal evidence.
Second, instructions to decide based on the evidence do not give any guidance on what to do with
that evidence.
54. To illustrate these points, consider the following dialog between the law personified and
an earnest, intelligent juror attempting to apply the rule:
The Law: You must find for the plaintiff if the plaintiff proves the disputed fact by
a preponderance of the evidence.
The Juror: Ok, so how do I determine that?
The Law: When you are persuaded that the fact is more likely true than not.
The Juror: Ok, great, so how do I determine that?
The Law: Consider all of the evidence.
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nothing in the rule helps to separate warranted and unwarranted
conclusions. This is a problem because proof rules should help guide
decisionmakers to a conclusion.55 At the crucial point of moving from
evidence to a conclusion, the preponderance rule leaves decisionmakers
with their own subjective beliefs. The rule ought to provide some guidance
as to what conclusions are warranted and unwarranted based on the
evidence.
The second problem with the preponderance rule is ambiguity in the
phrases “more likely than not” and “more probable than not.” This aspect
of the rule calls for a comparison of some kind, but it is not clear exactly
what is to be compared. It might mean the likelihood of the plaintiff’s
factual allegations versus the negation of those allegations, or it might
mean the likelihood of the plaintiff’s allegations versus the likelihood of
the defendant’s alternative allegations. The first interpretation appears to
better fit the instructions,56 but it fails with regard to the goals of error
minimization and allocation. If the plaintiff must prove that some fact, X, is
more probable than its negation, not-X, then the plaintiff should have to
show not only the probability that the state of the world is such that X is
true, but also the probability of every other possible state of the world in
which X is not true.57 This would mean that in order to prevail, plaintiffs
would have to disprove (or demonstrate the low likelihood of) each of the
virtually limitless number of ways the world could have been at the
relevant time. This would be a virtually impossible task, and thus, absent
conclusive proof, plaintiffs would lose. This would plainly be inconsistent
with the goals of the preponderance rule, and thus some comparison with
the defendant’s case is necessary.

The Juror: Ok, so I’m considering all of the evidence, now when should I be
persuaded that the fact is more likely true than not?
The Law: Um . . .
The Juror: Well?
And here the discussion ends. Further instructions to decide “carefully” and “deliberately” would
also fail to provide the necessary guidance.
55. See LAUDAN, supra note 22, at 31. The need for this guidance is not about mistrust of the
jury; it is about providing the jury with sufficient information to draw conclusions in ways likely to
foster the goals of the proof rules.
56. See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text; see also MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra
note 49, § 3.3 (“Preponderance is not a comparative standard: The question is not whether
plaintiff’s case is better than defendant’s but whether the evidence makes the points that the plaintiff
must prove more probably true than not.”).
57. See DOUGLAS WALTON, ABDUCTIVE REASONING 277 n.6 (2004) (“To say a statement is
improbable means that it is unlikely that it is true . . . . This notion is based . . . on placing the
statement as one in a set of statements that are independent of each other and that together exhaust a
set of outcomes.”).
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In order to facilitate the goals of the preponderance rule, the plaintiff
ought to prevail whenever the likelihood of his allegations exceeds that of
the defendant’s. Finding for plaintiffs when their allegations are more
likely true will, other things being equal, minimize errors. Moreover,
finding for plaintiffs under these circumstances allocates the risk of error
evenly—going against whichever party fails to offer the more likely
allegations (which ex ante may be either plaintiff or defendant). By
contrast, a rule that declares defendants should prevail in situations in
which the likelihood of a defendant’s allegation is lower than the
likelihood of the plaintiff’s allegation is inconsistent with the goals of the
rule. To the extent the preponderance rule is interpreted in ways that ignore
this comparative aspect, it fails.
B. Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
The BARD rule faces similar problems. Although the prosecution is
constitutionally required to prove each element of a crime BARD,58
conveying this rule’s requirements to jurors has proven to be notoriously
difficult.
Many interpretations of the BARD rule are inconsistent with its goals—
most importantly, reducing the risk of error for criminal defendants.
Similar to the preponderance rule, the most serious defect is a focus on the
decisionmakers’ subjective beliefs—rather than on features of the evidence
that would justify decisions—in trying to separate reasonable and
unreasonable doubts. Consider four examples. First, some jury instructions
define BARD as requiring the kind of certainty required for making
important decisions in one’s life.59 But many important decisions made in
life (jobs, medical procedures, relationships, etc.) are undertaken even
though one may have considerable doubts, and some jurors are more risk
averse than others. Second, reasonable doubts are sometimes defined as
those that would cause a prudent person to hesitate to act.60 But even
58. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
59. See, e.g., SIXTH CIRCUIT PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 1.03 (2005) (defining
BARD as “proof which is so convincing that you would not hesitate to rely and act on it in making
the most important decisions in your own lives”). The kind of certainty required under BARD is
sometimes described as a “moral certainty” in jury instructions. See, e.g., Victor v. Nebraska, 511
U.S. 1, 10–17 (1994) (upholding a “moral certainty” instruction). This notion is likely to be
misleading to jurors because it is a vestige from seventeenth- and eighteenth-century epistemology,
meaning something like beliefs that are “firm and settled truths, supported by multiple lines of
evidence and testimony.” LAUDAN, supra note 22, at 33; see also Barbara J. Shapiro, “To a Moral
Certainty”: Theories of Knowledge and American Juries 1600-1850, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 153 (1986)
(discussing the emergence and history of the concept).
60. See, e.g., Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 20 (1994) (upholding instruction and approving
of the definition of BARD as “a doubt that would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act”).
Although similar to the moral-certainty instruction, this definition differs in that it relies on the
inclinations of a more objective “reasonable person” while the first appears to refer to each juror’s
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prudent people sometimes act despite these doubts. Third, jurors are
sometimes told that they must have “an abiding conviction” of the
defendant’s guilt.61 But, as Professor Larry Laudan has argued, this is
either incoherent or wholly subjective.62 It is incoherent if it requires a truly
abiding conviction—which would persist over time—because jurors give
their judgments about the defendant’s guilt at that time.63 Alternatively, it
may just be a strongly held belief, but a strongly held belief may exist even
when it is completely irrational or unsupported by the evidence. This
instruction does not tell jurors when they should have a strongly held
belief.64 Fourth, BARD is sometimes just considered to be a “high
probability.”65 But there is no consensus as to what the probability should
be,66 and, more importantly, the determination of whether it has been met
would again involve subjective belief.67 Because any connection can exist
between subjective beliefs of decisionmakers and the truth, these
interpretations of the rule cannot perform the rule’s error-allocation
function based on a rational assessment of the evidence.
The U.S. Supreme Court has declared that due process does not require
that jurors receive a particular definition, or any definition at all, of
BARD.68 The purported rationale for this approach is that jurors already
understand the notion.69 But strong empirical evidence suggests
otherwise.70 There does not appear to be any stable, intuitive understanding
of BARD shared by juries, or by judges: for example, jurors and mock
own inclinations.
61. Id. at 14–15.
62. LAUDAN, supra note 22, at 39.
63. LAUDAN, supra note 22, at 39. For example, jurors are not asked to report later whether
they are still convinced the defendant is guilty (that is, whether their conviction was abiding).
64. LAUDAN, supra note 22, at 39–40.
65. LAUDAN, supra note 22, at 44–47.
66. See, e.g., United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 410 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (describing poll
of judges: the range for BARD was from 76% to 95%); C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof:
Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293,
1325 (1982) (describing poll of judges: 126 said high probability was at 90% or above, eleven said
at 75% or below, and one said at 50%); Rita James Simon & Linda Mahan, Quantifying Burdens of
Proof: A View from the Bench, the Jury, and the Classroom, 5 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 319 (1971)
(describing survey of judges based on a scale of 0 to 10: the mean for high probability was 8.9; 63%
gave a level of 9.0 or below).
67. See LAUDAN, supra note 22, at 44–47.
68. Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994) (“[T]he Constitution does not require that any
particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the government’s burden of proof.”).
69. See PATTERN CRIMINAL FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 2.04
(“The phrase ‘reasonable doubt’ is self-explanatory and is its own best definition.”); see also United
States v. Hall, 854 F.2d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 1988) (“[D]efinitions of reasonable doubt are
unhelpful to a jury.”).
70. For a useful general discussion of empirical literature on BARD, see Lawrence M. Solan,
Refocusing the Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases: Some Doubt about Reasonable Doubt, 78 TEX.
L. REV. 105, 119–32 (1999).
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jurors have quantified the government’s burden at around 61%,71 have
interpreted BARD to be less demanding than the clear-and-convincingevidence rule,72 and have expressed the idea that once there is some
evidence of guilt the defendant must persuade the jury of his innocence.73
Moreover, studies in which the common definitions of BARD are varied,
typically produce vastly different conviction rates.74 Surveys of judges also
suggest wide disagreement on the level of proof required by BARD.75
These difficulties suggest that BARD is an obscure, unclear idea—thus
making it difficult for the BARD rule to meet its goals regarding error
minimization and allocation. Professor Laudan has aptly described the
current BARD rule as “grievously inadequate, deliberately unclear, [and]
wholly subjective.”76 He summarizes the failure of BARD as follows:
The most earnest jury, packed with twelve people desirous of
doing the right thing and eager to see that justice is done, are
left dangling with respect to how powerful a case is required
before they are entitled to affirm that they believe the guilt of
the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. In such
circumstances, simply muddling on is not an attractive
prospect.77
These failures echo the failures of the preponderance rule.78
C. Clear and Convincing Evidence
As an intermediate decision rule between the preponderance and BARD
rules, the clear-and-convincing-evidence rule exhibits the difficulties of
both. The decision rule requires a level of proof more demanding than the
preponderance rule but less demanding than BARD.79 However, given the
uncertainty surrounding the preponderance and BARD rules, the clear-and71. Irwin A. Horowitz & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, A Concept in Search of a Definition: The
Effects of Reasonable Doubt Instructions on Certainty of Guilt Standards and Jury Verdicts, 20
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 655, 664 (1996).
72. Dorothy K. Kagehiro & W. Clark Stanton, Legal vs. Quantified Definitions of Standards
of Proof, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 159, 173 (1985).
73. Bradley Saxton, How Well Do Jurors Understand Jury Instructions? A Field Test Using
Real Juries and Real Trials in Wyoming, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 59, 97 (1998).
74. See Solan, supra note 70, at 119–32.
75. See supra note 66.
76. LAUDAN, supra note 22, at 30.
77. LAUDAN, supra note 22, at 31.
78. This is not to suggest that the rule, even in its present manifestations, is not valuable
(when compared with having no rule at all). Jurors do appear to take proof rules seriously in
deliberations, and the rules, no doubt, influence some outcomes. See Andreas Glockner &
Christoph Engel, Can We Trust Intuitive Jurors? An Experimental Analysis 23, MPI Preprints,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1307580. A rule may have some positive effect and yet still
fail miserably at providing sufficient guidance to meet its underlying goals.
79. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982).
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convincing rule’s requirements are also difficult to discern.
Typical jury instructions define the rule as requiring jurors to be
convinced that the fact at issue is “highly probably true.”80 This articulation
fails to provide guidance to decisionmakers for two reasons. First, it is not
clear exactly when the threshold of “highly probably” has been crossed.81
The U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged that “the difference between a
preponderance of the evidence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt
probably is better understood than either of them in relation to the
intermediate standard of clear and convincing evidence.”82 Moreover, one
study suggests that the rule is neither intuitively obvious nor well
understood: mock jurors have incorrectly interpreted the rule to require a
higher level of proof than under the BARD rule.83 Second, and more
importantly, the proof rule directs decisionmakers to focus on their
subjective beliefs rather than on features of the evidence. A juror could
believe a fact to be “highly probably” true for completely irrational
reasons. A rule that turns solely on beliefs of decisionmakers is not likely
to foster the rule’s normative goals.84
D. “Sufficiency of the Evidence”
For the reasons discussed above, the three common proof rules fail to
guide and constrain factual findings in ways that foster the rules’ goals. A
number of procedural devices depend upon these underlying proof rules,
and thus problems with the proof rules create additional problems with
these procedural devices. These devices include summary judgment and
judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) in civil cases and criminal
defendants’ challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence.
In civil cases, summary judgment allows courts to render a pretrial
judgment against a party based on insufficient evidence,85 and judgments
as a matter of law allow courts to render a judgment against a party at trial
or after a jury’s verdict based on insufficient evidence.86 For both motions,
80. See, e.g., PATTERN FEDERAL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 1.28
(defining “clear and convincing evidence” as “you [ ] are convinced that it is highly probable that it
is true”); see also MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 340 (approving of an instruction that informs
jurors “that they must be persuaded that the truth of the contention is ‘highly probable’”).
81. See MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 340.
82. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979). Given the lack of clarity regarding the
other two rules, this says a lot!
83. See Kagehiro & Stanton, supra note 72.
84. See LAUDAN, supra note 22, at 1.
85. FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
86. FED. R. CIV. P. 50. Rule 50 provides for judgments as a matter of law motions at trial, see
FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a), and for renewed motions after a jury’s verdict, see FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b). The
first motion corresponds to the previously labeled motion for a “directed verdict,” and the second
corresponds to the previously labeled motion for “judgment notwithstanding the verdict.” See FED.
R. CIV. P. 50, ADVISORY COMM. NOTE TO 1991 AMEND.
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in order to determine whether evidence is sufficient to support a
conclusion, judges must determine what a “reasonable” fact-finder could
conclude based on the evidence.87 This latter determination depends on the
underlying decision rule—namely, could a reasonable decisionmaker find a
particular fact at the level of proof required by the decision rule?88 But,
because what is required by the decision rule is unclear, what a reasonable
decisionmaker could conclude is likewise unclear. The uncertainty at the
fact-finding level thus ramifies to judicial sufficiency-of-the-evidence
determinations.89
And it has ramified in significant ways. Applications of summary
judgment and judgment as a matter of law have been the subject of
sustained criticism because in the absence of a clear standard, courts are
free to generate unprincipled applications.90 Professor Arthur Miller,
summing up the uncertainty of these standards, argues that “it is imperative
that the Supreme Court provide clarity rather than leaving the matter
entirely to the genial anarchy of trial court discretion.”91 At the root of this
uncertainty is a failure to specify which jury conclusions are reasonable
and which are unreasonable.92 And this uncertainty follows from the
failures of the proof rules to dictate when the evidence warrants a
particular conclusion. Moreover, this line between a reasonable and an
unreasonable conclusion is not only of practical importance, but also of
constitutional importance. A party’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury
depends on whether a reasonable jury could find in its favor.93 Thus, the
uncertainty created by unclear proof rules creates further uncertainty as to
whether parties’ constitutional rights are protected.
87. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250–56 (1986) (explaining that the
standard for both motions is whether “there can be but one reasonable conclusion”); see also
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149–50 (2000).
88. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252 (explaining that the reasonable jury standard “necessarily
implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof”).
89. See Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,”
“Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial
Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1058 (2003) (“The reasonable-jury standard is difficult to
elaborate upon or further define, and judges have invoked a number of ‘buzzwords’ in struggling to
articulate and apply it.”); see also Suja Thomas, The Fallacy of Dispositive Procedure, 50 B.C. L.
REV. 759 (2009) (criticizing the lack of clarity regarding reasonable-jury tests).
90. See, e.g., John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 542
(2007); Miller, supra note 89; Martin H. Redish, Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial:
Implications of the Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1330 (2005); Elizabeth Schneider,
The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705
(2007).
91. Miller, supra note 89, at 1134.
92. See Thomas, supra note 89.
93. Courts have the power to direct verdicts based on insufficient evidence, but not when the
evidence is sufficient to support a reasonable jury verdict. See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S.
372, 395 (1943); Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 659–61 (1935);
Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498 (1931).
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In criminal cases, defendants may likewise challenge convictions based
on insufficient evidence.94 The standard depends on whether a reasonable
jury could find the defendant guilty BARD. In Jackson v. Virginia,95 the
Court articulated the proper inquiry as “whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.”96
Despite the constitutional right of criminal defendants to sufficiency
review in criminal cases, courts are quick to rubber-stamp convictions.
Judge Jon Newman has called for courts to take sufficiency review more
seriously, noting that courts overturn convictions on sufficiency grounds
“very rarely,” and, even then, “they almost never do so by applying, in
explicit terms, the ‘reasonable doubt’ standard.”97 He explains that “on
those rare occasions when a federal appellate court accepts a claim that a
case should not have gone to a jury, it typically says simply that the
evidence is ‘insufficient[,]’ . . . that there is no evidence at all to support a
necessary element.”98 The lack of both serious review and explicit
reasoning can be traced to the proof rule. Because of the lack of criteria
establishing what would (and would not) be a reasonable conclusion given
the evidence and the BARD rule, courts lack a vocabulary through which
to make their reasoning explicit and to justify their doubts and convictions
about what a reasonable jury could or must conclude based on the
evidence.99
IV. SECOND-ORDER RULES
In the absence of criteria for applying a first-order rule consistent with
its goals, a second-order rule may be desirable to guide applications.100
Second-order proof rules may be constructed based on probabilistic or
explanatory criteria. These two possibilities arise from theoretical accounts
in evidence scholarship attempting to explain first-order rules and their
94. FED. R. CRIM. P. 29; Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 313–16 (1979).
95. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
96. Id. at 319 (declaring that due process requires that convictions must be supported by
sufficient evidence to meet this standard).
97. Jon O. Newman, Beyond “Reasonable Doubt,” 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 989 (1993).
98. Id.
99. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), itself illustrates the problem. The defendant
was convicted of first-degree murder for shooting a female acquaintance. Id. at 309–10. He
admitted the shooting. Id. at 310. But first, he claimed that it was accidental; then, he claimed that it
was self-defense; finally, he claimed that he was too intoxicated to form the requisite mens rea. Id.
at 310. It appears to be an easy case given the evidence, and the Court agreed unanimously that
there was sufficient evidence to support Jackson’s conviction. Id. at 324, 326. But—and here is the
critical point—the Court fails to tell us exactly why the evidence is sufficient and what might make
it insufficient. Id.
100. See Sunstein & Ullmann-Margalit, supra note 4, at 7.
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implications.101 Although I draw on aspects of these theoretical
discussions, I put them toward a different end. Rather than merely
explaining first-order rules, I construct an additional layer of rules to guide
and constrain the application of these rules.102 In this Part, I provide
content to second-order rules and explain their analytical relationship with
first-order rules. In the next Part, I will discuss further details of how to
operationalize second-order rules.
A. Failures of Probabilistic Second-Order Rules
The language of proof rules invites probabilistic interpretations. For
example, jury instructions for the preponderance and clear-and-convincingevidence rules employ language such as “more likely,” “more probable,”103
and “highly probably.”104 One possibility for second-order rules is thus to
translate each decision rule into a more explicit cardinal value between 0
and 1 (with 0 representing certain falsity and 1 certain truth): for example,
“preponderance” requires proof of a likelihood greater than 0.5; clear and
convincing requires proof beyond 0.75; and BARD requires proof beyond
0.9.105 For the reasons discussed below, however, probabilistic secondorder rules would fail to guide and constrain decision-making in ways that
foster the underlying goals of the proof rules.
Before turning to these reasons, however, I briefly note the important
value probabilistic interpretations serve in illustrating the analytical
implications of proof rules. Consider the preponderance rule as requiring
proof of “greater than 0.5” probability. This conception provides a useful
way to demonstrate how the rule functions with regard to error allocation.
When the probability of a disputed fact is 0.5 or below, the party with the
burden of proof will lose. So long as the probability is not 0, however, the
fact “not proved” might nevertheless be true, and thus, the verdict
erroneous. Likewise, any time the probability is greater than 0.5, the party
with the burden of proof will win. So long as the probability is less than 1,
however, the “proven” proposition might be false, and thus, the verdict
101. For examples of probabilistic accounts, see the scholarly sources cited supra note 13. The
explanatory account is provided in Michael S. Pardo & Ronald J. Allen, Juridical Proof and the
Best Explanation, 27 LAW & PHIL. 223 (2008). See Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The
Problematic Value of Mathematical Models of Evidence, 36 J. LEG. STUD. 107 (2007) (arguing that
formal modeling is of limited use in evaluating the probative value of legal evidence).
102. There is no necessary connection between the theoretical accounts and second-order
rules. One can, for example, accept a probabilistic theoretical account and reject probabilistic
second-order rules; likewise, one can accept the practical value of explanatory second-order rules
while rejecting an explanatory theoretical account of the underlying rules.
103. See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
105. See Richard S. Bell, Decision Theory and Due Process: A Critique of the Supreme
Court’s Lawmaking for Burdens of Proof, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 557, 574 (1987)
(referring to these numbers as “accepted translations”).
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erroneous. The parties thus share roughly equally in the risk of error in the
following sense: the party with the burden bears the risk of error when the
probability is between 0 and 0.5 and the party without the burden bears the
risk when the probability is between 0.5 and 1. Similar illustrations may be
provided for error reduction and other decision rules.106
Notwithstanding these insights, probabilistic criteria would fail to
provide effective second-order rules. Suppose second-order rules instructed
courts and jurors to employ the probabilistic values noted above (0.5, 0.75,
0.9) for the rules. Three main problems would prevent these second-order
rules from alleviating the failures of the first-order rules.107
The first problem concerns the subjectivity of probability assessments.
Second-order rules may refer to decisionmakers’ degrees of confidence or
certainty in the facts under dispute. If so, they fail for the same reasons as
first-order rules. There is no reason to think that degrees of certainty or
confidence are likely to be truth conducive: they may be irrational,
unreasonable, or have nothing to do with the evidence. There would thus
be no reason to think that these second-order rules would achieve better
results regarding error allocation and error reduction. For example, in our
contract dispute between Andy and Betty, the second-order rule would
allow any probabilistic assessment at all between 0 and 1, regardless of the
evidence.
The second problem concerns the lack of objective statistical data.
Probabilistic rules could perhaps be employed in ways that better achieved
their goals if conclusions based on the rules were constrained by objective
probabilistic data, rather than subjective levels of certainty or confidence.
However, although statistical evidence is sometimes available for isolated
items of evidence, data regarding the vast majority of evidence will be
lacking. Thus, conclusions will again collapse into the problems noted in
the previous paragraph. With our contract example, even if some statistical
data is available (e.g., about the frequency of similar contracts), this
evidence must be combined with other non-quantified evidence in the case,
again licensing any assessment at all between 0 and 1.108
The third problem has to do with computational complexity. Even if we
had the data necessary to overcome these problems, an additional problem
would prevent second-order rules from serving their goals. Namely, the
number of calculations required of decisionmakers would quickly outstrip
106. For probabilistic accounts of error reduction, see Hamer, supra note 13; Kaye, supra note
6. For probabilistic accounts of decision rules that allocate the risk of error asymmetrically, see
Kaplan, supra note 32; Lillquist, supra note 13.
107. Additional problems for the probability approach are mentioned in the notes.
108. Additional problems with quantified evidence may include whether particular evidence is
a typical member of the class for which data is available, see Allen & Pardo, supra note 101, and
the possibility of quantified evidence overwhelming non-quantified evidence, see Lawrence H.
Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329,
1361 (1971).
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their capabilities. This is not just a point about competence regarding
statistical reasoning109—it goes much deeper. For example, in our contract
example, calculating the probability based on just ten pieces of evidence
would quickly outstrip the ability of decisionmakers to render a decision.110
For these reasons, probabilistic second-order rules are untenable.111
B. Explanatory Second-Order Rules
Explanatory criteria provide more plausible second-order rules than
probability criteria. Under an explanatory account of decision rules,
propositions are considered proven, or not, based on how well they explain
the evidence and events under dispute.112 Under probability approaches,
decisionmakers infer conclusions based on how likely a proposition
appears, given what is known about the evidence.113 The explanatory
approach reverses the inferential process. Under this approach,
decisionmakers infer conclusions based on how well each proposition, if
true, would explain the evidence.
Our contract-dispute example can illustrate the difference. Under a
probability approach, the decisionmaker assesses the probability of each
element of a contract, given (or conditioned upon) the evidence.114 Under
109. See Jonathan J. Koehler, The Psychology of Numbers in the Courtroom: How to Make
DNA-Match Statistics Seem Impressive or Insufficient, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1275, 1279–80 (2001)
(“A large body of research on statistical reasoning suggests that people have poor intuitions when it
comes to reasoning with statistics in general and forensic science statistics in particular.”)
(collecting sources).
110. Ronald J. Allen, Constitutional Adjudication, the Demands of Knowledge, and
Epistemological Modesty, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 436, 444 (1993).
Suppose there are only ten pieces of evidence . . . . To apply Bayes’ Theorem to
appraise the probability of that proposition being true requires a thousand
computations. In the understated language of Gilbert Harman, “to be prepared for
twenty evidence propositions, one must record a million probabilities. For thirty
evidence propositions, a billion probabilities are needed, and so forth.”
Id. (quoting Gilbert Harman, Change in View 26 (1989)).
111. Moreover, even if each of these problems could be solved, further analytical problems
remain for probabilistic rules. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Sarah A. Jehl, Burdens of Proof in Civil
Cases: Algorithms vs. Explanations, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 893 (2003) (discussing the
conjunction paradoxes).
112. See Pardo & Allen, supra note 101, at 229. Decision-making under the explanatory
account resembles the process of “inference to the best explanation” in the philosophy of science;
Gilbert Harman, The Inference to the Best Explanation, 74 PHIL. REV. 88, 88–89 (1965); see also
PETER LIPTON, INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION (Routledge 2d ed. 2004); Paul R. Thagard,
Evaluating Explanations in Law, Science, and Everyday Life, 15 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCH. SCI.
141, 141 (2006).
113. This can be accomplished either by assigning a probability to each atomic proposition or
to conjunctions of such propositions.
114. Under this approach, the probability would move up or down based on the introduction of
each new item of relevant evidence.
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the explanatory approach, by contrast, the decisionmaker assesses whether
the existence (or nonexistence) of a contract better explains the evidence
and disputed events than other competing explanations (e.g., that the
plaintiff is lying or mistaken). This decision-making process occurs in two
steps: (1) identifying potential explanations, and (2) selecting the one that
provides the best or better explanation. At the first step, decisionmakers
rely primarily on the parties to provide and frame the potential
explanations.115 At the second step, a number of general criteria provide
grounds to assess the strengths or weaknesses of explanations. These
criteria include: consistency, simplicity, coherence with background
beliefs, consilience (the extent to which many and different kinds of facts
are explained), and the absence of ad hoc premises.116 Most important to
this second step is its comparative nature. Explanations are not the better or
best in isolation; they are better or worse as compared to available
alternatives.117
Explanatory second-order rules avoid the problems that beleaguer
probabilistic second-order rules. First, although the choice among
competing explanations involves judgment by decisionmakers, explanatory
inferences avoid the problem of pure subjectivity that affects confidencebased probability assessments. The choice among explanations depends on
objective features of the evidence, and thus explanatory rules can guide and
constrain decision-making based on these features. Second, explanatory
inferences avoid the need for statistical data for each item of evidence.
However, explanatory rules can incorporate and assess statistical evidence
and combine it with non-quantified evidence in a straightforward way;
with both kinds of evidence and their combinations the inquiry is the same:
what would best explain it?118 Finally, the lack of numerous calculations
with explanatory rules avoids the problem of computational complexity.
Moreover, unlike probabilistic reasoning, jurors and judges are already
familiar with, and generally good at, constructing and evaluating
115. Legal factfinders, however, may develop their own explanations of the disputed events.
See Pardo & Allen, supra note 101, at 229.
116. See Thagard, supra note 112, at 142. There is no general formula or algorithm for
combining these variables; rather, the presence of each tends to make an explanation better.
Moreover, for those inclined toward the probability approach, the explanatory considerations may
also be used to assign probabilities to the propositions at issue. Furthermore, probabilistic evidence
may itself be assessed based on the explanatory criteria. Nothing in the explanatory framework
precludes incorporating many of the benefits of the probabilistic approach, while avoiding its
defects. Pardo & Allen, supra note 101, at 230.
117. Explanations are thus “contrastive.” See Lipton, supra note 112, at 33 (“A contrastive
phenomenon consists of a fact and a foil, and the same fact may have several different foils. We
may not explain why the leaves turn yellow in November simpliciter, but only for example why they
turn yellow in November rather than in January, or why they turn yellow in November rather than
blue.”).
118. See Pardo & Allen, supra note 101, at 263 (discussing statistical evidence under an
explanatory framework).
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explanations.119
Given the underlying goals of the proof rules, I now explore the content
of explanatory second-order rules. Based on their goals of error
minimization and allocation, the following second-order rules provide
criteria for applying the first-order proof rules:
First-Order Rule: A fact must be proven by a preponderance
of the evidence.
Second-Order Rule: A fact is proven by a preponderance of
the evidence when the best explanation of the evidence and
events in dispute includes this fact.
The second-order rule expresses the intuitive notion that of two or more
explanations the one that best or better explains the evidence is more likely
to be true.120 Deciding based on explanatory criteria will, other things
being equal, minimize errors and allocate the risk of error roughly evenly
between the parties by directing the decisionmaker to compare the
contrasting explanations that favor each side.121 For example, in our
contract dispute, Andy will have proven his claim by a preponderance of
the evidence if his explanation122 better explains the evidence than Betty’s
explanation.
First-Order Rule: A fact must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence.
Second Order Rule: A fact is proven by clear and convincing
evidence when the explanation of the evidence and events in
dispute that includes this fact is clearly and convincingly
better than explanations that do not.

119. See, e.g., NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 339–41
(2007). On the psychology of explanations more generally, see Frank C. Keil, Explanation and
Understanding, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 227, 247 (2006) (“The processes of constructing and
understanding explanations are intrinsic to our mental lives from an early age.”); Tania Lombrozo,
The Structure and Function of Explanations, 10 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 464, 468 (2006) (“The
predominance of explanation presents a challenge for approaches to reasoning and inference that
focus exclusively on decontextualized statistical evidence.”).
120. The better explanation may, of course, turn out to be false. But, likewise, the more
probable possibility may turn out to be false. This is just the problem of induction, and it does not
distinguish explanatory from probabilistic approaches.
121. Depending on the substantive law and how the parties frame the factual issues, the better
explanation may be general or disjunctive. These features of explanations are discussed more fully
in the next Part, including how to incorporate additional explanations put forward by the parties or
formulated by the jurors themselves.
122. Andy’s explanation must include the legal elements—otherwise he will have failed to
state a claim. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
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Because the quality of an explanation is an indication of its likely truth,
this second-order rule requires better proof than under the preponderance
rule by requiring not only that the best explanation favor the party with the
burden of proof, but that this explanation be clearly and convincingly better
than the opposing party’s. This rule thus allocates more of the risk of error
to the party with the burden of proof than under the preponderance rule.
For example, under this rule Andy’s explanation would now have to be
clearly and convincingly better than Betty’s.123
First-Order Rule: A fact must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Second-Order Rule: A fact is proven beyond a reasonable
doubt when there is a plausible explanation of the evidence
and events in dispute that includes this fact and no plausible
explanation that does not include this fact.
This second-order rule allocates this risk even further to the government
than the clear-and-convincing rule. The rule requires that the government
first provide a plausible explanation consistent with the defendant’s guilt
and then warrants a conviction unless there is a plausible explanation
consistent with innocence.124 The rule thus tracks the two conventional
ways in which a defendant may succeed at trial—by attacking the
government’s theory or by offering an alternative one of his own. For
example, suppose now that Andy and Betty are both prosecuted for
entering into an illegal contract. Under this rule, the prosecution has
proven them guilty BARD if (1) the prosecution has provided a plausible
explanation of the evidence that includes the elements of the crime, and (2)
Andy and Betty failed to offer an alternative plausible explanation of the
evidence which does not include one or more of the elements. In other
words, they ought to be acquitted if either the prosecution fails to provide a
plausible explanation or they offer a plausible alternative.
C. Second-Order Rules or Second-Order Standards?
Second-order rules are meant to guide and constrain applications of
first-order rules. Before discussing how to implement these rules in the
next Part, I conclude this Part with some general details that further
elucidate the nature of second-order rules.

123. Under this rule, therefore, any close calls regarding the explanations should go to Betty.
124. See DOUGLAS WALTON, ABDUCTIVE REASONING 35 (2004) (“A plausible inference is one
that can be drawn from the given apparent facts in a case suggesting a particular conclusion that
seems to be true. Both a proposition and its negation can be plausible.”).
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One point of clarification is whether the rules are meant to be
mandatory or defeasible guidelines (or “rules of thumb”).125 They are
meant to be mandatory and apply in all cases in which first-order rules
apply. The rules could function merely as defeasible guidelines or rules of
thumb if, and only if, some other criteria could override explanations. But
for this to be true, the criteria would have to somehow indicate that a worse
explanation is more likely to be true than a better one (and it would have to
do so without appealing to explanatory criteria). Probabilistic criteria
cannot serve this function, and it is not clear what else could. Thus, while
which explanatory criteria are salient in any given case may differ, the
quality of explanations controlling the outcome ought to remain constant.
Crafting mandatory rules in this context serves traditional justifications
for rules: guiding and constraining decisionmakers in the face of
uncertainty, easing decision-making, and locating authority in the proper
jurisdictional body.126 Moreover, the lack of other criteria provides an even
deeper justification for mandatory rules. Given the absence of other
criteria, there is no way to peer beyond the explanations, as it were, and
determine the facts. Therefore, even though mandatory rules will create the
typical downside to rules—over- and under-inclusiveness with regard to
their goals127—there is no way to appeal beyond the rules directly to the
goals of error minimization and allocation in particular cases. In this
context, over- and under-inclusiveness means that (1) sometimes the better
explanations will be poor indicators of truth, and (2) sometimes poor
explanations will be true. But in any given case, evidence suggesting that
either possibility is the case should be incorporated into the explanationevaluation process itself and not serve as the basis for an appeal to other
criteria (for there are none).128
A second point of clarification concerns whether the rules should in fact
be labeled “rules” rather than “standards.” Throughout this Article I have
referred to proof rules broadly to mean any legal directive (including
standards). Nothing in my discussion turns on the choice of label. But,
given the prominence of the distinction, discussing the second-order rules
in terms of the distinction may help to further elucidate them. Although the
second-order directives exhibit some “standard”-like behavior, they appear
to more closely resemble “rules.” The standard-like behavior they exhibit
includes that 1) there will be decisionmaker discretion in choosing among
125. See SCHAUER, supra note 3, at 109 (defining a “rule of thumb” as “a rule that is
vulnerable to the inapplicability of its background justifications”).
126. Id. at 135–66.
127. Id. at 31–34; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Forward: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
HARV. L. REV. 22, 58 (1992). Generally, a rule is over-inclusive when it applies to cases that do not
fit with the reasons for the rule; a rule is under-inclusive when it fails to apply to cases that do fit
with the reasons for the rule. Id.
128. This problem can also be addressed with admissibility rules designed to control the
evidence on which decisions are made.
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competing explanations, and 2) the outcomes will not always be
straightforward and determinate. To the extent that rules and standards
comprise two poles of a continuum based on discretion and
determinateness, then perhaps the label “standard” is warranted.129
Two features, however, suggest that the label “rule” is more
appropriate. First, the content of the directives is determined ahead of time
rather than at the time of decisions.130 Although what makes one
explanation better than another will vary from case to case, the quality of
an explanation needed to satisfy the rule remains constant. Second,
standards allow for discretion in deciding cases by falling back on their
underlying reasons, while rules may apply without reference to their
underlying reasons.131 In the context of proof rules, these reasons concern
error minimization and allocation. Because no other criteria better serve
these reasons—and because it would be inappropriate for fact-finders to
make their own choices regarding these reasons—the second-order
directives resemble rules rather than standards.132 On this last point, the
second-order rules fit Professor Kathleen Sullivan’s description of a rule as
“a standard that has reached epistemic maturity.”133 In this context, the
epistemic maturity is recognizing that explanatory criteria are not only
relevant for applying decision rules, they are necessary.
V. OPERATIONALIZING SECOND-ORDER RULES
The practical value of second-order rules depends on how they may
potentially improve existing legal rules and practices. In this Part, I explore
these issues on two levels: fact-finding at trials and procedural rules in civil
and criminal cases that require judgments about the sufficiency of
evidence.
A. Jury Instructions
Second-order rules are meant to improve factual decision-making by
bringing decisions in line with the underlying goals of proof rules. These
goals include minimizing errors and allocating the risk of error. Whether
the second-order rules would have the desired effects regarding these goals
is a complex empirical question. This question depends not only on the
limitations noted earlier regarding proof rules,134 but also on complex
129. Id.; see also SCHAUER, supra note 3, at 104 n.35 (rejecting “specificity” and “vagueness”
as criteria for distinguishing rules and standards).
130. Cf. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557,
560 (1992) (distinguishing rules and standards based on “the extent to which efforts to give content
to the law are undertaken before or after individuals act”).
131. See SCHAUER, supra note 3, at 73–76; Sullivan, supra note 127, at 58.
132. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754–55 (1982).
133. Sullivan, supra note 127, at 62.
134. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text.
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psychological questions regarding how jurors might understand and
implement second-order rules.135 In the absence of this information, the
conclusions below can be only tentative at best. I discuss areas in which,
based on current empirical understanding of juror decision-making,
second-order rules are more likely to improve decision-making, and I
provide reasons to think the rules will guide decisions toward the rules’
underlying goals. I also note areas in which more empirical testing is
needed.
The success or failure of second-order rules will depend on how jurors
(and judges) implement them. To understand this, it is necessary to first
examine the psychology of juror decision-making in the absence of such
rules. The best empirical model of juror psychology is “the story model.”136
According to this well-confirmed137 model, jurors impose a narrative
structure on the evidence, attempting to organize the evidence they hear
into coherent versions of events by using their background knowledge
about analogous situations, generalizations about the world in general, and
their assumptions about gaps in the evidence.138 After constructing
narratives, jurors then decide which narrative to accept based on three
criteria: coverage, coherence, and uniqueness.139 Finally, jurors consider
verdict alternatives and match the narrative to the verdict categories,
choosing the best fit between narrative and verdict category.140 As a
descriptive account of juror behavior, the story model provides some
insight into where the second-order rules may be more or less helpful.
One situation in which they may not add much involves cases under the
preponderance rule that depend on a choice between competing detailed
explanations. According to the story model, jurors construct narratives to
explain the evidence before them.141 This suggests that despite clear
guidance from the preponderance rule, jurors are already drawing
conclusions in ways that are consistent with the explanatory criteria in a
second-order preponderance rule. If this is so, then a further instruction
may do more harm than good if it creates more confusion than current
instructions. Alternatively, the instruction may solidify for jurors that their
default decision-making process is a sound one, which may improve
deliberations and outcomes. This is an issue that calls for more testing.
135. Kevin M. Clermont, Standards of Proof Revisited 16, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1321029 (“The psychological mechanism for implementing standards of proof remains to be
discovered.”).
136. Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Model of Juror Decision Making: The
Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 520–21 (1991).
137. VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 119, at 135 (“Many subsequent studies . . . have lent support
to the basic assumptions of the story model and expanded on its implications.”).
138. Pennington & Hastie, supra note 136, at 523–25.
139. Pennington & Hastie, supra note 136, at 527.
140. Pennington & Hastie, supra note 136, at 529–30.
141. Pennington & Hastie, supra note 136, at 521–22.
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Second-order rules may improve decisions under the preponderance
rule, however, when cases depend on either general or disjunctive
explanations. Unlike detailed narratives or stories, explanations can
sometimes be quite general. For example, in a res ipsa loquitur case, an
explanation such as “the defendant did something negligently that caused
my injuries” may be a better explanation than the defendant’s explanation,
and thus satisfy the proof rule—without any particular narrative account
supporting the plaintiff.142 Second, unlike narratives or stories,
explanations can be disjunctive (that is, they may be composed of
inconsistent possibilities). For example, if a case was reduced to liability
only if a stoplight were red—the explanatory process could be reduced to a
choice between whether the light was red (explanation # 1) versus whether
the light was green or yellow (explanation # 2).143 Or a case with five
distinct possibilities might be reduced to the plaintiff’s explanation being
“A or B” and defendant’s being “C or D or E.”144 The explanations for
comparison—whether general or specific, whether singular or
disjunctive—would depend on the ways the parties choose to contrast the
evidence and the details that matter to the substantive law. As with general
explanations, choices among disjunctive explanations may come out
differently under the proof rules than under the story model. Outcomes
consistent with the proof rules will better serve their underlying goals, and
thus, the rules will improve decision-making if they cause jurors to draw
the conclusions they dictate.145 Further testing may be needed to see
whether the rules have this desired effect.
Second-order rules have the most potential to improve decision-making
in cases in which the clear-and-convincing and BARD rules apply. In the
absence of these rules, jurors may be (consistent with the story model)
making decisions based on which side’s explanation is better. If so, this
more closely resembles decision-making under the preponderance rule.
Therefore, second-order rules may function by pushing decisions to better
accord with the asymmetrical allocation of errors mandated by the clearand-convincing and BARD rules.146 Moreover, there is reason to think that
142. See Byrne v. Boadle, 159 Eng. Rep. 299, 299–300 (Exch. 1863).
143. See Dale A. Nance, Naturalized Epistemology and the Critique of Evidence Theory, 87
VA. L. REV. 1551, 1578 (2001).
144. For examples of cases involving disjunctive explanations, see Zuchowitz v. United States,
140 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing the requirement that the defendant’s actions must be a
“but-for” cause of plaintiff’s injury); Rhesa Ship Co. v. Edmunds (1985) Weekly Law Rep. 948
(H.L.(E.)) (defining what it means to prove a case on a “balance of probabilities”).
145. More generally, evidentiary rules may be desirable whenever narrative reasoning is likely
to lead to results that deviate from the goals of the proof process. See Doron Menashe & Hamutal E.
Shamash, The Narrative Fallacy, 3 INT’L COMMENT. EVIDENCE 1, 8–9 (2005); see also Dan Simon,
A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
511, 517–20 (2004).
146. Even the poorly understood first-order rules appear to have some effect on juror reasoning
in this context. See Glockner & Engel, supra note 78 (suggesting that proof rules affect juror
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second-order rules will improve matters because jurors (and judges)
already appear to have problems understanding what is required by either
first-order rule.147 Second-order rules may improve matters by focusing
decisionmakers on the types of explanations necessary to satisfy these
rules. This is particularly important with the BARD rule. As Professor
Lawrence Solan has demonstrated: many BARD instructions improperly
direct jurors to search for explanations that point to innocence—or to
closely scrutinize explanations offered by defendants—without first
focusing on the strength or quality of the government’s explanation.148 The
BARD second-order rule, however, focuses jurors on both sides of the
equation, giving the level of scrutiny to each side suggested by the goals of
the BARD rule.
B. Sufficiency Reviews
Second-order rules fit within existing civil- and criminal-procedural
rules, and they guide and constrain judicial decision-making to align with
their procedural goals. In both types of cases, procedural devices require
judicial determinations of whether the evidence is sufficient to support a
verdict. These devices include judgment as a matter of law and summary
judgment in civil cases and sufficiency challenges by criminal defendants.
In civil cases, both judgment as a matter of law and summary
judgments require courts to assess the sufficiency of the evidence.
Judgments as a matter of law149 may be entered against a party at trial or
after a verdict when “the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have
a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.”150
Prior to trial, parties may move for summary judgment by showing there is
no “genuine” issue of fact and that they are “entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.”151 The summary judgment standard, the U.S. Supreme
Court has explained, “mirrors” the standard for judgments as a matter of
law at trial—that is, whether “there can be but one reasonable conclusion
as to the verdict.”152 A determination of what a reasonable jury could do
“necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that
would apply at the trial on the merits.”153 In other words, what might be a
reasonable conclusion (for purposes of either summary judgment or
JMOL) under the preponderance rule might not be under the clear-andconvincing rule.

inferences).
147. See infra Parts III.B–C.
148. See Solan, supra note 70, at 137.
149. FED. R. CIV. P. 50.
150. Id.
151. FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
152. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
153. Id. at 252.
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Because these procedural devices depend on the underlying proof rules,
clarity regarding the rules is necessary for implementing the procedural
devices. As discussed above, however, this has not been the case with
either device.154 Despite vigorous litigation and commentary surrounding
these issues, little has been done to guide judicial decision-making on what
is a reasonable or unreasonable conclusion based on the evidence. Secondorder proof rules guide and constrain decision-making on this question in
ways that foster the goals of the underlying first-order proof rules.
Consider first a case in which the preponderance rule will apply.
Suppose the defendant (e.g., Betty in our contract example), who would
not have the burden of proof at trial, moves for summary judgment or
JMOL. Given the second-order rule, the defendant is entitled to summary
judgment or JMOL when no reasonable jury could find the plaintiff’s
explanation to be a better explanation of the evidence and disputed events
than the defendant’s explanation (or those that favor the defendant).155 If
the plaintiff (e.g., Andy in our contract example) moves for summary
judgment or JMOL, he ought to prevail when no reasonable jury could fail
to find his explanation to be better than the defendant’s.156 Similar
considerations apply to cases under the clear-and-convincing rule. If the
defendant moves for summary judgment or JMOL, the motion ought to be
granted when no reasonable jury could find the plaintiff’s explanation
clearly and convincingly better than the defendant’s. And when the
plaintiff moves for summary judgment or JMOL, the motion ought to be
granted when no reasonable jury could fail to find the plaintiff’s
explanation to be clearly and convincingly better.
These procedural standards would guide and constrain decision-making
in a number of beneficial ways. First, they focus judicial attention and
lawyers’ arguments on features of the evidence and the parties’ abilities to
explain it. Second, they constrain judicial reasoning by providing criteria
for which conclusions are “reasonable” and “unreasonable”—in denying or
granting motions, judges ought to provide reasons why some explanations
are better or worse than others. Third, the standards guide and constrain
outcomes consistent with the goals underlying the proof rules. Serving this
function—that is, aligning outcomes with what is dictated by the proof
rules—provides a sound theoretical foundation for these procedural
devices. Finally, the standards protect parties’ Seventh Amendment right to
a jury trial. The constitutionality of both devices depends on the line

154. See supra Part III.D.
155. In other words, any reasonable jury must find defendant’s explanation at least as good or
better than plaintiff’s explanation, otherwise summary judgment or JMOL is improper. Anderson,
477 U.S. at 250.
156. Any reasonable jury must find plaintiff’s explanation better, otherwise summary judgment
or JMOL is improper. Id.
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between reasonable and unreasonable conclusions.157 A judgment is
constitutional so long as it is consistent with the only reasonable
conclusion given the evidence; it is unconstitutional if a reasonable jury
could find for the non-moving party. In providing order and clarity to this
line between reasonable and unreasonable conclusions, second-order rules
serve to protect the constitutional right to a jury trial.
In criminal cases, second-order rules also protect constitutional rights.
Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to the BARD proof rule.158
In addition, defendants may argue prior to, at, and after trial that the
evidence against them is or was insufficient to prove their guilt BARD.159
As discussed above, however, these sufficiency reviews are feckless, and
courts lack criteria to guide and constrain their decision-making on this
question.160 As in civil procedure, second-order rules can fill this gap. The
inquiry is whether a reasonable jury could find guilt BARD, and this, in
turn, depends on what is required by the BARD rule. The second-order rule
provides these requirements and thus criteria for determining whether a
reasonable jury could find guilt BARD. Under the second-order rule, a fact
is proven BARD when there is a plausible explanation that includes this
fact and no plausible explanation that does not. Therefore, in arguing that
the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction, defendants ought to
succeed in their motions when: no reasonable jury could find both that (1)
the prosecution’s explanation is plausible, and (2) the absence of a
plausible explanation supporting the defendant. In other words, a defendant
ought to prevail on the motion by showing that any reasonable jury must
find either (1) the prosecution’s explanation to be implausible, or (2) the
defendant’s explanation to be plausible.
This sufficiency standard serves a number of important functions. First,
it focuses judges’ and lawyers’ attention on features of the evidence in
deciding and arguing about which inferences are reasonable. Second, it
guides and constrains judges in their reasoning, providing criteria on which
to make and justify these decisions. Third, it aligns decisions in this area
with the important goals of error minimization and allocation underlying
the proof rules. Finally, it provides order and clarity in order to protect the
constitutional rights of criminal defendants.
VI. CONCLUSION
As argued in this Article, the adoption of second-order proof rules may
improve not only factual decision-making at trial but also decisions on
procedural judgments in both civil and criminal contexts. By providing
157. See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 395 (1943); Baltimore & Carolina Line,
Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 659 (1935).
158. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970).
159. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979); FED. R. CRIM. P. 29.
160. See Part III.D.
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criteria for applying current rules, second-order rules may better align
decision-making with its goals in these areas and may thus increase
accuracy and more fairly allocate the risk of error.
I conclude by discussing two possible implications of the analysis in
this Article. First, the move to second-order rules naturally invites
questions about third-order (and n-order) rules. Are we now off on an
infinite regress? And is this a problem? My answers here are: “not
necessarily” and “no.” It is possible that third-order (and n-order) rules
may become desirable. For example, generalizations may emerge from
applying second-order rules in certain types of cases such that it may be
possible to identify stable criteria for identifying better and worse
explanations. If rules employing these criteria foster decisions better in line
with the underlying goals of the proof rules—then so much the better.161
And within these third-order contexts, further generalizations may emerge,
which may suggest additional rules, and so on. Now, it would be extremely
difficult for higher-order rules to capture the diversity and complexity
among individual cases to promote results consistent with the goals of the
proof rules. But, if successful, the arguments in this Article would not
preclude nor be challenged by these developments; they would be welcome
extensions.
The second implication is the possibility of second-order rules in other
areas of law. As noted in the Introduction, proof rules are just one example
of decision rules within the law. The strategy of constructing second-order
rules may thus have wider applications. Any factual conclusion in law will
involve inferences based on possible explanations of the evidence.
Therefore, the decision rules that govern these contexts may be
supplemented with second-order rules. Some examples might be
“substantial evidence” in the administrative context,162 “probable
cause,”163 and reviews for “clear error”164 and “harmless error.”165 Many
legal questions also involve decision rules, as Mitchell Berman has
demonstrated with regard to several constitutional issues.166 Thus, secondorder rules may be desirable here—or in any legal context—whenever the
decision rules fail to guide and constrain decision-making consistent with
their underlying goals.

161. Such rules may be particularly helpful if there is wide divergence among jurors or judges
on the threshold of what makes an explanation plausible in certain types of cases.
162. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2006).
163. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
164. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a).
165. See Jason M. Solomon, Causing Constitutional Harm: How Tort Law Can Help
Determine Harmless Error in Criminal Trials, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1053, 1089–90 (2005) (noting
uncertainty in harmless-error doctrine).
166. See Berman, supra note 2, at 10–17.
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